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A day aŌer China launched its second aircraŌ carrier, the American administraƟon under 
Mr. Donald J. Trump appeared jubilant about celebraƟng the first 100 days of its 
“America first” policy. Asian naƟons have to grapple with an uncertain security 
environment which lacks the structure or predictability that existed during the Cold War. 
They are caught between an aggressive China — their largest trading partner and their 
security ally or partner — and an increasingly capricious United States. Should one 
kowtow and shape Asia’s “common desƟny” or negoƟate a deal to “make America great 
again”? This arƟcle explains three ways in which India and Japan refuse to be caught in 
binary choices and are gradually creaƟng room within which other Asian countries can  
maneuver. 
First, India and Japan under Prime Ministers Modi and Abe respecƟvely, have aƩempted 
to change the geopoliƟcal imaginaƟon of their naƟons. By 2014 China had announced its 
plans to link the Eurasian landmass and Pacific Rimland (through ports, pipelines, etc) by 
reviving the mariƟme and conƟnental ‘Silk Road’. In 2015 India and Japan signed a joint 
statement to mutually work towards building peace and stability in the Indo‐pacific 
region within a decade. This was the first Ɵme the two naƟons agreed to expand the 
geographic scope of their strategic partnership (almost a decade aŌer Abe first proposed 
it in India). UnƟl 2014 the two naƟons looked for convergence in their foreign policies 
(‘Act East’, ‘ProacƟve ContribuƟon to Peace’, ‘Make in India’, ‘Quality Infrastructure 
IniƟaƟve’, etc...). The United States under the Obama AdministraƟon addiƟonally 
engaged in ‘burden sharing’ and insƟtuƟon building, as well as recognizing Indian and 
Japanese intenƟons to break out of their middle power status. It promoted India’s 
‘leading power’ ambiƟons and supported the unprecedented changes in Japanese 
security legislaƟon to make it more ‘proacƟve’.  
Secondly, India and Japan are making aƩempts to transform the security order rather 
than being either status‐quo naƟons or revisionist actors. The United States expects its 
Asian partners to balance against Chinese aggression while China’s biggest concern is a 
joint coaliƟon that would resuscitate the ‘cold war mentality’ of containment. China has 
increasingly used its geoeconomic tools puniƟvely to target trade, tourism, and other 
sectors against any diplomaƟc disobedience. This was glaringly visible when South Korea 
decided to go ahead with seƫng up the THAAD missile defense system against Chinese 
wishes. Recently Beijing standardized the names of Arunchal Pradesh localiƟes with 
Chinese character in retaliaƟon against the Dalai Lama’s visit to the Indian state (which 
Beijing claims is part of “South Tibet”). Meanwhile, Japan has deployed its helicopter 
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carrier Izumo to a tour through the South China Sea (where China and ASEAN countries 
have disputed territories). AddiƟonally, Izumo will parƟcipate in the Indo‐US‐Japan Malabar 
exercise in the Indian Ocean in July this year. Such “resistance” by India and Japan is a sign 
that both naƟons are unwilling to be dictated to by China.  
India and Japan are keen to play acƟve roles and engage in close cooperaƟon with all actors 
in their respecƟve resƟve neighborhoods on issues for which China exercises influence such 
as the North Korean nuclear crisis or negoƟaƟons on Afghanistan. The complexity of 
relaƟons further illustrates that states in this region cannot adopt simple strategies of 
balancing, band‐wagoning, or hedging; rather, India and Japan need to present alternaƟves 
to others that are unable to aﬀord to maneuver in the present system. 
Third, India and Japan are moving beyond middle power narraƟves as they seek to support 
smaller Asian naƟons and provide alternaƟves to China’s “win‐win” diplomacy that has 
placed naƟons like Sri Lanka and Cambodia in a Chinese debt‐trap. In 2016 India and Japan 
arƟculated a joint “Free and Open Indo‐Pacific strategy” towards achieving this goal, but 
have not yet spelled out any specifics. The two countries can assist with the need to fill the 
esƟmated $1.3 trillion esƟmated infrastructure gap in the region. China, under the 
pretense of connecƟvity and trade, is aƩempƟng to “hard‐wire” geopoliƟcal realiƟes and 
Chinese influence, brush territorial disputes and disagreements under the carpet and carry 
out business as usual. Neither India, Japan, nor the United States were among the 28 
countries that sent heads of government to China’s maiden Belt and Road Forum. Before 
the forum develops into an overarching plaƞorm to discuss Indo‐Pacific security issues, 
India and Japan need to quicken the pace of infrastructure cooperaƟon. 
In order to succeed Japan and India must compete with China’s ability to mobilize 
resources at a fast pace and engage in robust diplomacy without threatening smaller 
naƟons or appearing intervenƟonist. India is seeking Japan’s help to regain lost geopoliƟcal 
capital in its neighborhood. UlƟmately, India and Japan need to help realize the aspiraƟons 
of smaller naƟons like Sri Lanka, Nepal, Vietnam, Pacific Island countries, and others who 
need economic and security assistance.  
Finally, the role of the United States to project power and influence is also of great 
significance to Indian and Japanese strategy. Recent talks of the creaƟon of an Asia Pacific 
Stability IniƟaƟve (with a fund of approximately $7.5 billion) and other diplomaƟc 
overtures hold the potenƟal to stem the direcƟon of the current power transiƟon in the 
region. Asian naƟons now have to deal with an America that expects allies to do most of 
the heavy‐liŌing, and security guarantees in the future will be condiƟonal on free and fair 
trade. Unlike before, it is the United States (in order to retain its dominance) that has to 
strengthen credibility in dealing with a new geostrategic landscape, where intra‐Asian 
trade is high and China is no longer shy about its hegemonic aspiraƟons. UlƟmately the 
United States would have to pressure China and maintain the security and stability of the 
region. To preclude China’s hegemony or Sino‐US rapprochement, India and Japan are 
breaking out of their tradiƟonal roles and are willing to shoulder the responsibility of 
securing the Indo‐Pacific region. 
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